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PERCOLATION, UNIFORMITY, AND
COHERENT ADJUDICATION: THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT EXPERIENCE
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss*

Two important lessons had been taught by the reactions to the Freund
and Hruska Reports. One was that it was politically unacceptable to shut
off any case in the lower federal courts from access to the Supreme Court
by way of certiorari,however unavailing that might be in reality.

. .

. In

addition, a widespread sentiment was evident among the bench and bar
against having "specialized courts."'

CONGRESS

established the Federal Circuit as a response to two

studies of the federal docket: the Freund Commission Report,
which considered ways to ease the then-burgeoning caseload of
the Supreme Court, 2 and the Hruska Commission Report, which dealt
with similar issues in the federal courts of appeal. 3 Congress expected
that the Federal Circuit would solve the second problem by taking patent
cases-which many judges found technologically complex, legally esoteric, and time consuming-out of the regional appellate system.4 And
because one court would decide all patent cases, Congress assumed that
circuit splits in patent law would be eliminated, thus thinning the Supreme Court's docket as well. 5 Further, by establishing a court that would
entertain appeals from both trials and Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) determinations, Congress hoped that the Federal Circuit would
also resolve a third problem: eliminating the "notorious difference[s]" the
Supreme Court had noticed between the patent validity standards applied
* Pauline Newman Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I would
like to thank Peter Lee and the faculty at U.C. Davis for their insightful discussion of this
paper.
1. Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the FederalCircuit:A PersonalAccount, 41 AM U. L.
REV. 581, 587 (1992).

2. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF
THE SUPREME COURT (1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 584 (1972) (named for its Chairman, Professor Paul A. Freund).
3. COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FED.
BOUNDARIES

COURT APPELLATE Sys., THE GEOGRAPHICAL
OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

(1973), reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 223, 228 (1973) (named for its Chair, Senator Roman
Hruska).
4. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1989).
5. Id. at 6-7.
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by the PTO and by the courts. 6
But as the above statement by Daniel Meador-one of the court's principal architects-suggests, concentrating patent cases in a single court was
controversial.7 There was a hope that the court's immersion in patent law
would allow it to develop significant expertise in this arcane field,8 but
there were also many concerns. To paraphrase a well-known proverb, if
all the judges have is the hammer of patent law, every social problem
they encounter could easily come to look like a nail.9 They might, in other
words, begin to see patents as the only incentive to innovate and lose
sight of the many other reasons to invent-competition, lead-time advantage, curiosity, professional advancement, personal enjoyment, reputational interests-and discount other forms of legal protection such as
copyright, trademark, and trade secrecy.1 0 Furthermore, the one-dimensional nature of the docket could make the court vulnerable to capture by
well-organized, well-heeled lobbyists-which is to say, the patent industries-at the expense of the public's interest in access to creative products
and technological information." Even if the judges withstood the pressure, their absorption in a single field might lead them to take it out of
the jurisprudential mainstream and render patent law even more esoteric. 12 To accommodate these fears, Congress gave the Federal Circuit
case (rather than issue) jurisdiction, thus enabling its judges to see patent
disputes embedded in a broader context.13 Moreover, the legislature assigned the court cases in a few areas far removed from patent law.14 As
Meador predicted, Congress also kept the Supreme Court in the mix so
that a generalist tribunal would have ultimate authority over patent
6. Id.; see Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
7. See Meador, supra note 1, at 587.
8. See, e.g., Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 42-43 (1981) (statement of the Hon. Howard T. Markey, C. J., Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals). At the same hearing, it was opined that patents were
"the most unattractive thing about being a Federal judge." Id. at 46 (statement of Rep.
Sawyer).
9. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme
Court-And Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 790 (2010).
10. See id.
11. Id. at 789-90.
12. See Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 25.
13. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377,
412-14 (comparing the Federal Circuit's case jurisdiction to the issue jurisdiction of the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA)).
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006) (providing for jurisdiction over appeals of regional
adjudication of all patent disputes and certain tort cases brought against the United States;
of decisions of the Court of Federal Claims and the Court of International Trade; of certain
decisions of the International Trade Commission; of decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board; of certain tax decisions from the courts of the Canal Zone, Guam, the Virgin
Islands, and Northern Mariana Islands; of dispute resolution under the Contract Disputes
Act and various economic measures, including the Harmonization Tariff Schedule, the Economic Stabilization Act, the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, the National Gas Policy Act, and the Energy Policy Conservation Act; and of certain agency action under the
Federal Labor Relations Authority, the Patent Act, and the Lanham (Trademark) Act).
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jurisprudence.1 5
Much has happened in the thirty years since the Federal Circuit was
founded. Most obviously, patent law is no longer exotic. Patent filings
have exploded worldwide, issues arising in patent cases are routinely covered by the popular press, 16 economists regularly study the effect of patents on social welfare,' 7 and there is a growing legal literature on
innovation. Because many other changes in the economy and technology
have occurred in this time period as well, it is impossible to credit the
Federal Circuit with prompting all of this attention. But it is surely responsible for some of it. Under its direction, patents are considered more
dependable investments.1 8 Indeed, the success of the court has spurred
many other countries to develop specialized intellectual property tribunals; studies of those courts suggest that they too are improving the efficiency with which intellectual property disputes are resolved.' 9
But even if the concerns expressed at the time of the court's founding
have been allayed, a problem that was largely unforeseen has emerged:
the high cost of eliminating intercircuit debate from the adjudicatory system. The architects of the Federal Circuit certainly realized that channeling appellate cases to a single forum would limit percolation. 20 However,
they saw uniformity as the critical goal.2 1 At the time the court was created, forum shopping was rampant; some circuits were more than four
times more hospitable to patents than others. 22 Further, the designers of
the new system seriously discounted the value of percolation. 23 Indeed,
Dan Meador considered percolation largely overrated in the statutory
context:
As applied to judicial interpretations of federal statutes, "percolation" is a euphemism for incoherence. The argument has the
earmark of being an effort to put a good face on a bad situation.
Whatever modest value there may be in these regional discrepancies
as to federal statutory provisions, the benefit is outweighed by the
15. See Meador, supra note 1, at 587.
16. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, THE
ATLANTIC (July 12, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-thereare-too-many-patents-in-america/259725/ (discussing the patent war fought over smart
phone technology between Apple, Samsung, and Motorola); Azeen Ghorayshi, Can a Patent Own Your Genes?, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.motherjones.com/bluemarble/2011/12/myriad-genes-patent-lawsuit (discussing the validity of patents covering the
human genes BRCA 1 and BRCA 2, which are associated with early-onset breast cancer).
17. See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2012-035A), availableat http://research.stlouis
fed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf.
18. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy,and
Interpretationat the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGs L.J. 1025, 1072 (2007).
19. INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. INST. & U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
STUDY ON SPECIALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COURTS 2, 5 (2012) (noting that over

ninety countries have established some sort of specialized tribunal).
20. Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 7.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 6-7.
23. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architure: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeal, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 633-34 (1989).
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. The percolation that

produces intercircuit inconsistencies and incoherence may provide
intellectual stimulation for academicians, but in the world of human
activity it works costly inequities. 2 4
Meador was not alone in this view. In the 1980s, many esteemed
proceduralists had become disenchanted with the idea-which owed its
origins to the Evarts Act25-that there was benefit in allowing the appellate courts to decide cases independently of one another. 26 According to
Henry Friendly, the lack of sub-Supreme Court capacity for "authoritative determination" of statutory issues was the most significant question
facing the judicial system. 27 Paul Bator expressed a similar sentiment:
"[P]ercolation is not a purposeful project. It is just a way of postponing
decision." 2 8 To Erwin M. Griswold, "'the law' has become a gossamer
web with very little in it on which a lawyer or judge can firmly and safely
rely." 29 Or as Dan Meador memorably rephrased the point, settling statutory questions is more important than settling them "right." 30
Yet the experience of the Federal Circuit suggests that in the absence
of percolation, much can go awry. On several issues, the court has swung
back and forth between extremes. 31 In other areas, no single approach
has developed. 32 Nor has Supreme Court review helped. 33 The Court
deals with patent law in the same way that it deals with other fields: it
articulates norms and policies, but it rarely lays down specific rules. 34 nstead, it leaves implementation to the lower courts.35 But with only one
appellate court to refashion the law, and with that court the one whose
decision was (often unfavorably) reviewed, the outcomes can leave much
to be desired. 36 As Rebecca Eisenberg so aptly put it, the relationship
between the Supreme Court and federal patent law "sometimes seems
like that of a non-custodial parent who spends an occasional weekend
with the kids."3 7 In short, it appears that federal law depends rather cru24. Id. at 634.
25. Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 827 (1891).
26. Id.
27. Paul D. Carrington & Paulina Orchard, The Federal Circuit:A Model for Reform?,
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 575, 583 (2010).
28. Paul M. Bator, What is Wrong With the Supreme Court?, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673,
690 (1990).
29. Erwin M. Griswold, The Federal Courts Today and Tomorrow: A Summary and
Survey, 38 S.C. L. REV. 393, 406 (1987).
30. Carrington & Orchard, supra note 27, at 583.
31. See discussion infra notes 121-24.
32. See discussion infra note 125-31.
33. See generally John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator":A Prescriptionfor Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REv. 657 (2009).
34. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Federal Circuit En Bancs in an Era of Active Supreme
Court Review, LANDSLIDE, Nov.-Dec. 2011, at 8, 11-12 (discussing the decision in KSR v.
Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007)).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Commentary, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit:
Visitation and Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 28 (2007),
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cially on percolation in intermediate courts, even in a field like patent law
with clear statutory underpinnings.
The Federal Circuit is now thirty years old, and a third generation of
judges is taking over the bench. These jurists have an opportunity to rethink the Federal Circuit's practices and to influence the Supreme
Court's. They also face formidable challenges. With knowledge products
becoming more salient in the economy and more countries beginning to
innovate at global levels, countries with effective patent laws will enjoy
an increasingly important comparative advantage. The America Invents
Act (AIA), 38 which was enacted in 2011 and becomes effective in stages
through 2013, was meant to keep U.S. law competitive, 39 but it raises
many new questions.40 In this changing environment, answering these
questions "right" becomes ever more urgent.
This comment is in three parts. The first discusses the tradeoff between
uniformity and getting it "right," arguing that the experience of the Federal Circuit demonstrates that the '80s proceduralists were mistakenthat achieving uniformity does not create coherence, nor does it compensate for the loss in accuracy. The second part examines the role of percolation in adjudication. The last section demonstrates how recent changes
in patent law and its administration offer to restore dialogue and debate
to the patent system
I. UNIFORMITY VS. ACCURACY: WERE
THE ARCHITECTS RIGHT?
There has been considerable debate over the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence and whether, in the quest for uniformity, too much has been sacrificed. 4 1 While there is no easy way to determine when a decision is
"right," there are many signs that the judiciary and members of the creative community have become uneasy with the tradeoff and with law developed single-handedly by the Federal Circuit.
A review of the Supreme Court's activity in the patent arena is suggestive. In the first fifteen years of the Federal Circuit's existence, the Supreme Court largely left the court-or more generally, patent
jurisprudence-alone. It heard only eight cases involving patent issues,
available at http://www.michiganlawreview.orglassets/fi/106/eisenberg.pdf. See generally
Dreyfuss, supra note 9.
38. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
39. See, e.g., Acting Secretary Blank and USPTO Director Kappos Join President
Obama at the American Invents Act Signing Ceremony, DEP'T OF COM. (Sept. 16, 2011),
http://www.commerce.gov/blog/2011/09/16/acting-secretary-blank-and-uspto-director-kap
pos-join-president-obama-america-invent.
40. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Priorityand Novelty under the AIA (UC Berkeley Pub.
Law Research, Paper No. 2130209, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2130209.
41. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1238-39 (2012).
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four on purely procedural questions. 42 In the next half of the circuit's life,
however, the Court stepped up its review considerably. It considered
twenty-eight patent cases, nineteen on substantive patent-law questions. 43
Significantly, in over 80% of the cases considered, the Supreme Court
reversed, vacated, modified, or otherwise seriously questioned the Federal Circuit's approach." Given the significance of circuit splits to decisions to grant certiorari, 4 5 and considering that only four of the cases
involved court splits, 4 6 this level of activity suggests that, at least in the
Supreme Court's view, uniformity does not compensate for the loss of

42. Listed in chronological order. See Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S.
809 (1986) (reviewing a decision of the Supreme Court of Florida that held contrary to a
Federal Circuit decision, Interpart Corp v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985), on an issue
of patent preemption); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988);
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83
(1993); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520
U.S. 17 (1997). See generally John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 Sup. Or. REv. 273.
43. See Pfaff v. Wells Elec., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998) (reversing a decision of the Eleventh Circuit taking an approach similar to that of the Federal Circuit on the relationship
between patent law and intellectual property law); Fl. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Says. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150
(1999); Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer
Hi-Bred Int'l., Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys.,
Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005);
Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547
U.S. 28 (2006); Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007); MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007);
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF
Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635 (2009); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Microsoft Corp. v.
i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v.
Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011); Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB
S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct.
1670 (2012); Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013);
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Gunn v.
Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013); FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). I also include
in the total Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 548
U.S. 124 (2006), where a writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted. I include it because the vigorous dissent by Justice Breyer had a strong impact on the law of
patentable subject matter.
44. See sources cited supra note 43.
45. See, e.g., Sup. Cr. R. 10(A) (listing circuit splits as the first consideration in the
decision to grant certiorari).
46. Ronald Mann, Is the New Economy Driving the Court's Docket?, ScoruSBLOG
(Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=153842 (noting a decline in the grant rate
from 84 cases in the 2010 October term to 48 so far in the 2012 October term). The four
cases are Christianson(split with the Seventh Circuit on where review should take place),
Bonito Boats (split with the Supreme Court of Florida on patent preemption), Gunn (split
with the Supreme Court of Texas on whether patent malpractice cases arise under federal
law), and Actavis (split between the Eleventh and Federal Circuits on the one hand and the
Third Circuit on the other). See 486 U.S. 800; 489 U.S. 141; 133 S. Ct. 1059; 133 S. Ct. 2223.
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accuracy. 47
To be sure, three of the cases-Christiansonv. Colt Industries, Holmes
Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, and Gunn v. Minton-merited review because of the Federal Circuit's unique position in a system
that largely assigns cases geographically. 48 All three consider when a case
involving a patent law issue "arises under" federal patent law. 4 9 Thus,
they all involved the allocation of cases between the Federal and regional
circuits. 50 Only the Supreme Court (or Congress) can decide that question definitively. 5 '
Still, these cases betray concern about prizing uniformity over other
goals. Because Christianson,decided in 1988, was only the second Federal
Circuit case the Supreme Court reviewed, the decision to apply the wellpleaded complaint rule to the question of whether appeals go to the Federal or regional circuit was based entirely on the Court's interpretation of
the jurisdictional statutes in question. 52 That is, in directing the case,
which had a patent defense, to the Seventh Circuit, the Court found that
even if Congress had intended to produce perfect uniformity in the administration of patent law, it had done an imperfect job. 53 By 2002, how47. Ronald Mann suggests that the upsurge in interest should be attributed to rising
interest in intellectual property law rather than to concerns over the Federal Circuit. See id.
(noting that the Court reviews a similar number of cases from the Sixth Circuit as it does
the Federal Circuit). However, if the architects of the Federal Circuit were right, the Federal Circuit should not be reviewed at the same rate as courts whose decisions give rise to
circuit splits. Moreover, the Supreme Court would not be reversing so many of the court's
decisions. In addition, if the thesis were correct, there should be at least as many copyright
cases reaching the Supreme Court. Admittedly, copyright cases do not raise jurisdictional
boundary issues, however there are many more copyrighted works than patented inventions and because these cases are heard in the regional circuits, they can give rise to circuit
splits. Still, the Court has considered only fifteen copyright cases during the relevant time
period. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013); Golan v. Holder,
132 S. Ct. 873 (2012); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003); N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures
Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998); Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l,
Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Fogerty
v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994); Prof'[ Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730 (1989); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985);
Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985). 1 did not count Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), which was decided after the Federal Circuit was created but before it started to hear cases; Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A.,
131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (per curiam), which was affirmed by an equally divided Court and
involved the same issue as Kirtsaeng;or Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
539 U.S. 23 (2003), and Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985), which involved
copyright issues tangentially.
48. See Christianson,486 U.S. at 803-04; Holmes, 535 U.S. at 827; Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at
1062.
49. See Christianson,486 U.S. at 807; Holmes, 535 U.S. at 827; Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at
1062.
50. See Christianson,486 U.S. at 807; Holmes, 535 U.S. at 827; Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at
1062.

51. See Christianson,486 U.S. 807; Holmes, 535 U.S. at 827; Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1062.
52. See 486 U.S. at 813-14.
53. See id. at 819.
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ever, when the Supreme Court decided Holmes, it had more experience
with specialization. 54 Once again, the Court interpreted the statute
strictly-it decided that patent law counterclaims do not create a case
within the Federal Circuit's purview. 5 5 This time, however, Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion in which he questioned the notion that
uniformity was the highest value. 56 Noting that under Holmes "other circuits will have some role to play in the development of this area of the
law," he argued that "[a]n occasional conflict in decisions may be useful
in identifying questions that merit this Court's attention. Moreover, occasional decisions by courts with broader jurisdiction will provide an antidote to the risk that the specialized court may develop an institutional
bias."5 7 Gunn, which involved a patent malpractice claim, raised a different countervailing interest: the state's "special responsibility for maintaining standards among members of the licensed professions."5 8
The debate between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit over
the use of bright line rules is another indicator that the sound administration of justice requires more than uniformity. The Federal Circuit is
drawn to clear rules. For example, at one time, it deemed processes to be
patentable subject matter only if they were tied to a machine or effectuated a physical transformation; 59 it required the PTO and lower courts to
apply a "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" test to determine whether
an invention was nonobvious; 60 it developed a set of rules that largely
eliminated resort to the doctrine of equivalents (which extended the
scope of infringement beyond the literal claims); 61 it laid down a "general
rule" of awarding injunctive relief in cases where a valid patent was found
to have been infringed; 62 and it equated patents with market power in
antitrust cases.63 In a system in which uniformity is prized, it is easy to
understand why such bright line rules would be desired. 64 Trial judges do
not have the expertise enjoyed by specialized jurists and clear rules help
lay decisionmakers treat like cases alike, even if some of the complexities
in the technological parts of the cases are obscure. 65
54. See Holmes, 535 U.S. at 827.
55. Id. at 832-33.
56. Id. at 838-39 (Stevens, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 839. Interestingly, however, Congress reversed the Supreme Court's disposition on these issues in the AIA. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338(a) (Supp. V 2011).
58. 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013).
59. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 958-59 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff'd, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.
Ct. 3218 (2010).
60. In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
61. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 566-78 (Fed.
Cir. 2000), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
62. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated,
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
63. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
64. Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 798-99.
65. See generally Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010)
(attributing the tendency toward formalism to the cognitive burden technological issues
place on lay judges).
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And yet the Supreme Court rejected every one of these rules. In Bilski
v. Kappos, it barred exclusive use of the machine or transformation test. 66
Writing for the plurality, Justice Kennedy reasoned that use of a "categorical rule denying patent protection for inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress .. . would frustrate the purposes of the patent law." 67
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., the Court was even more
blunt. 68 It introduced its discussion of the teaching, suggestion, or motivation tests by first "rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of Appeals"
and continuing to criticize the court's rigidity five more times in the decision. 69 In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., on the
doctrine of equivalents, the Supreme Court said it could "see no substantial cause for requiring a more rigid rule" than had been used in the
past, 70 and in a second case on the same issue, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoko Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Justice Kennedy stressed that "we have
consistently applied the doctrine in a flexible way, not a rigid one."71 In
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court criticized the
Federal Circuit's "general rule" favoring permanent injunctive relief and
emphasized the equitable factors that need to be considered. 72 And in
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., a tying case, it endorsed
a rule-of-reason analysis.73
Significantly, in many of these cases, the Court also pursued a goal
closely related to percolation. Rejecting patent exceptionalism, it faulted
the Federal Circuit for failing to consider how similar issues are treated in
other areas of the law. The Court has been particularly insistent in the
case of procedural issues where there is an obvious commonality among
fields. Thus, in its very first review of a Federal Circuit decision, Dennison
Manufacturing Co. v. Panduit Corp., the Court held that there could be
no deviation from the standard set by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a) for reviewing the district court's factual findings. 74 In eBay, the Supreme Court was shocked by the court's failure to consider the "traditional test" on injunctive relief.75 Similarly, Medlmmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc. criticized the Federal Circuit's narrow definition of what
constitutes a "case or controversy" and mandated the more generous ap66. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
67. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. See 550 U.S. 398, 415, 419, 421-22, 428 (2007).
69. Id.
70. 520 U.S. 17, 32 (1997).
71. 535 U.S. 722, 738 (2002).
72. 547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006).
73. 547 U.S. 28, 42 (2006). The Supreme Court similarly adopted a rule of reason for
determining when the settlement of a patent case violates the antitrust laws. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). The Federal Circuit regarded such settlements as
nonactionable. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
74. 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986).
75. 547 U.S. at 390. Whether the Court's own four-part test correctly stated a rule that
was traditional is another issue. See generally Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court's
Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 CoiUM. L. RiV. 203
(2012).
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proach used in other fields. 76
Even in cases involving substantive patent law issues, the Court's preference is that the Federal Circuit consider analogous approaches in other
realms. For instance, in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., which
addressed the standard for determining whether a defendant accused of
inducing infringement had the appropriate intent, the Court affirmed the
Federal Court's resolution but adopted the standard of culpability from
traditional criminal law doctrines.7 7 Similarly, in Illinois Tool, the Supreme Court took the Federal Circuit to task for failing to glean from the
work of the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and
Chicago School economists that patents should not be presumed to confer market power.7 8
Other concerns appear to go well beyond exceptionalism; the Court
also appears worried about substantive patent law-in particular, with
whether the Federal Circuit overvalues patents to the detriment of public-access interests. The MedImmune reversal gave licensees, who are in a
unique position to challenge patent validity, greater ability to do so. 79 The
reversal in Caraco PharmaceuticalLaboratories,Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk facilitated the approval of non-infringing generic drugs.80 The Cardinal
Chemical Co. v. Morton International,Inc. reversal, which prevented the
Federal Circuit from vacating decisions of invalidity when the defendant
had been found not to infringe, added another access-protective feature.8 i It preserves "the interest of the successful litigant" in developing
"markets [for] similar products in the future," as well as the public interest in a definitive determination of invalidity. 82
By the same token, the Court has been active on the question of defenses to patent infringement. In Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I,
Ltd., it expanded the scope of the statutory research exemption.8 3 Both
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics Inc. and Microsoft Corp. v. AT
& T Corp. imposed limits on infringement liability. 84 Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank used
the Eleventh Amendment to shield states that infringe upon patent rights
from claims for monetary damages.85
76. 549 U.S. 118, 126-27 (2007).
77. 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068-69 (2011).
78. 547 U.S. at 45.
79. See 549 U.S. at 137; see also Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 676 (1969).
80. See 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1683 (2012).
81. 508 U.S. 83, 99-101 (1993).
82. Id.
83. 545 U.S. 193, 207 (2005). But see Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179,
190-91 (1995) (narrowing the statutory exemption for resowing seed found in the Plant
Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2541).
84. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008); Microsoft
Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 442 (2006). Bowman v. Monsanto Co. examines a
Federal Circuit decision expanding the scope of infringement liability. 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764
(2013).
85. 527 U.S. 627, 634-35 (1999).
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Most significantly, in a stream of cases beginning with Justice Breyer's
dissent from the denial of certiorari in Laboratory Corp. of America
Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories,Inc. (Lab Corp), the Court has questioned whether the Federal Circuit expanded the scope of patentable subject matter so far that patents could be obtained on material crucial to
technological development.8 6 Warning that "sometimes too much patent
protection can impede rather than promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts," Breyer would have invalidated a patent on a medical diagnostic. 8 7 While the Lab Corp dissent led the Federal Circuit to reevaluate
its analysis of patentable subject matter, the Supreme Court continued to
find fault with the Federal Circuit's approach.8 8 In Bilski, the Court affirmed the invalidation of three claims to hedging methods as too abstract
but rejected the Federal Circuit's sole reliance on the machine or transformation test.8 9 Furthermore, even though the Bilski Court agreed that
the test might furnish a "clue" to patentability,90 in Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,Inc., the Court reversed a decision
validating patents on a diagnostic that recited specific physical transformations. 9 1 According to Justice Breyer, "[U]pholding the patents would
risk disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying natural laws,
inhibiting their use in the making of further discoveries." 9 2 Similarly, in
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the Court
held that isolated genomic DNA is not patentable, reiterating that exceptions to patentability are necessary to avert the "considerable danger that
the grant of patents would tie up the use of [the basic tools of scientific
and technological work] and thereby inhibit future innovation premised
upon them." 93
Of course, it is possible that the Federal Circuit, with its special expertise in patent law, has it right and that the generalists on the Supreme
Court fail to appreciate the ways in which the Federal Circuit has chosen
to supervise the lower courts, develop patent law doctrines, and balance
the public's access demands against the proprietary interests of patentees.94 Were the Court alone in questioning the outcomes of Federal Circuit cases, one might conclude that the architects' initial instincts were
correct, and the Supreme Court should have been eliminated from the
system to spare the specialists review by untrained generalists.
The Supreme Court is not, however, alone in its concerns about the
Federal Circuit's jurisprudence. Most glaring is the heavy participation of
amicus curiae at both the Supreme Court and in cases the Federal Circuit
86. See, e.g., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 126, 134-38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. See id.
89. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
90. Id. at 3227.
91. 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
92. Id.
93. 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111, 2116 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Significantly, Congress disagreed with the Supreme Court on the ambit of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction. See supra note 56.
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takes en banc. 95 Getting it right is (obviously) important to the parties;
one would certainly anticipate that losers would petition for en banc rehearings and for certiorari and that both sides would argue these cases
vigorously. But if the community's interest were largely in uniformity,
there is no reason to expect broader participation. Nevertheless, as Colleen Chien has pointed out, over 1,000 briefs were filed in Federal Circuit
and Supreme Court patent cases between 1989 and 2009, with slightly
more amicus filings in the Federal Circuit than the average in other circuits. 96 Admittedly, the Federal Circuit is especially hospitable to these
briefs. 97 It'has a liberal grant policy and takes the unusual step of maintaining a list of bar associations that are invited to file. 9 8 The Federal
Circuit's desire for these briefs does not, however, explain the willingness
of the creative community-lobbying organizations, such as Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO); universities, professors, and scientists;
both state and federal government entities; and consumer groups-to
spend the time and money weighing in on cases in which they have no
direct involvement.9 9 Nor does it explain activity in the Supreme Court,
where many more briefs are filed in favor of granting certiorari to patent
cases than on the side of declining review.1oo
The prevalence of these filings suggests that the public cares more
about accuracy than the champions of uniformity thought.1 0' Mayo attracted more than thirty amici;102 Myriad and Bilski, over fifty-five
each. 0 3 In Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership,which raised a question
about the evidentiary standard to be used in reviewing prior art, over
sixty amicus briefs were filed.'" Indeed, there were seven amicus briefs
filed in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., which dealt with a question about
the on-sale bar that was esoteric even to patent lawyers. 05 As John Duffy
has noted, the Solicitor General plays an increasingly active role in patent
cases, which further suggests there is a strong public interest in how patent law issues are resolved and not merely in their uniform resolution.106
That view is reinforced by reports of the National Academies, the Federal
Trade Commission, the Department of Justice, and the Health and
95. See generally Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts' Friends
Can Teach Us About the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 395 (2011).
96. Id. at 398-99 & n.21.
97. Id. at 398.
98. Id. at 398, 406; FED. CIR. R. 29(b) ("The clerk will maintain a list of bar associations and other organizations to be invited to file amicus curiae briefs when the court directs. Bar associations and other organizations will be placed on the list if they request. The
request must be renewed annually not later than October 1.").
99. Chien, supra note 95, at 410-15.
100. Id. at 424.
101. See id. at 398-99.
102. See 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
103. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013);
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
104. See 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2249-52 (2011).
105. See 525 U.S. 55, 65-68 (1998).
106. John F. Duffy, The FederalCircuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General,78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 518, 520 (2010).
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Human Services Secretary's Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society,
which all have critiqued the impact of Federal Circuit decisions on such
matters as research, competition, and the delivery of healthcare. 107
Also telling is the high level of dissent within the Federal Circuit. As
Richard Revesz argues, dissenting is costly. 10s The circuits put pressure
on the judges to produce their fair share of majority opinions, but judges
receive no credit for writing dissents. 109 Further, a dissenting judge loses
power to influence majority opinions while inflicting extra work on the
colleague who must respond to the attack.11 0 If uniformity were the principal value, one would expect few Federal Circuit judges to roil the waters
by dissenting. And yet the percentage of dissents in the Federal Circuit is
the second highest in the federal system.1 11 Indeed, thanks to the newest
judges, the rate of dissent may well be increasing. 112 It is probable that
some of these dissents are confined to disagreement on the application of
fact to law.113 However, the persistence of dissent suggests that the court,
though charged with producing uniformity, also cares about substance. 1 14
The opinions of Judge O'Malley, the first trial court judge to be elevated to the Federal Circuit, 115 reflect another dimension of the uniform107. See, e.g., SEC'Y's ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & Soc'Y, GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS To GENETIC
TESTS
63-71 (2010), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/
SACGHS-patentsreport_2010.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION

AND COMPETITION 5, 18 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/
P04010lPromotinglnnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF
THE NAT'L ACADS., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH (2006), availableat
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.govfbooks/NBK19865/pdf/TOC.pdf; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL
OF THE NAT'L ACADS. OF SCIENCE, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21sT CENTURY (Stephen
A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004); FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.

108. Richard L. Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical
Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit,76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100,
1110 (2001).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Christopher A. Cotropia, Determining Uniformity Within the Federal Circuit by
Measuring Dissent and En Banc Review, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 801, 803 (2010).
112. See Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Dissenting Opinions at the Federal Circuit,
PATENTLY-O

(Sept. 2, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/09/dissenting-opin-

ions-at-the-federal-circuit.html (showing a high dissent rate for Judges O'Malley and
Reyna, appointed in 2010 and 2011, respectively).
113. See Cotropia, supra note 111, at 803, 815-16.
114. See id. Judge Rader has, for example, consistently dissented on the application of
the written description requirement. See, e.g., Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598
F.3d 1336, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting) (listing all of his previous
dissents on the issue). See generally Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 421 (2009); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An EmpiricalAssessment ofJudicialPerformance,152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004)
(examining the substantive issues on which judges dissent).
115. Jason Rantanen, Judge Kathleen O'Malley Confirmed to the Federal Circuit, PA.
TENTLY-O (Dec. 24, 2010), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/12/judge-kathleen-omal
ley-confirmed-to-the-federal-circuit.html.
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ity versus accuracy question: the impact that decisions can have on
adjudication. While a district judge, Judge O'Malley led a panel discussion of trial judges which highlighted the problems associated with the
Federal Circuit's de novo review of claim construction.11 6 Noting that this
approach can lead to reversals and retrials, the judges felt that the Federal Circuit was "demoraliz[ing]" the lower bench." 7 Not surprisingly,
now that Judge O'Malley is on the Federal Circuit, she has dissented on a
variety of questions regarding inter-tribunal relationships, including the
question of how to review claim interpretation.'1 8 Like the Supreme
Court, she has also criticized the adoption of "hard and fast" rules which,
she claims, pose real difficulties for the district courts that must apply
them.119
The level of dissent in the Federal Circuit and the concerns expressed
by district court jurists also suggest that the goal of uniformity may be
something of an illusion. In some areas, the law has swung from one extreme to another. The jurisprudence on inequitable conduct in the PTO
illustrates the point. In its early years, the Federal Circuit considered inequitable conduct broader than common law fraud and made it fairly
easy to demonstrate the elements of materiality and intent.120 Over time,
it made these elements so easy to prove'21 that allegations of inequitable
conduct became-in the Federal Circuit's own words-"an absolute
plague."1 22 In 2011, the court took a case en banc and radically raised the
standard of both materiality and intent.123 Whether this is the final word
on inequitable conduct is hard to say. Should misconduct in the PTO rise
in reliance on the new lenient standard, the standard could be altered
again and would be applied, like the previous standards have been ap116. Kathleen M. O'Malley et al., A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the
Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 679-80 (2004).
117. Id. at 682.
118. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(O'Malley, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that the remand ordered by the majority will
cause unnecessary delay); Memorylink Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 676 F.3d 1051, 1052 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (O'Malley, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2734 (2012); Byrne v. Wood,
Herron & Evans LLP, 676 F.3d 1024, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O'Malley, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc on the issue of the court's jurisdiction over malpractice claims); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (O'Malley, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc on
the question of de novo review of claim construction), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 833 (2013).
119. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1297 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc) (O'Malley, J., dissenting in part).
120. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559-60 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (requiring proof that a reasonable examiner would have considered the material
important and permitting intent to be inferred from conduct).
121. See, e.g., Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253,
1257-59 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that materiality depended on what an examiner would
have liked to know and that intent could be inferred from materiality).
122. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
123. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291 (requiring "but for" the conduct, the patent would
not have been granted and requiring proof of specific intent to deceive, with no inference
to be drawn from materiality).
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plied, retroactively.12 4
While the law on inequitable conduct has had a clear up-and-down trajectory, the history of claim construction illustrates that sometimes there
is no trajectory at all. Claim construction is an area where uniformity is
particularly valuable. Indeed, in a rare affirmance of the Federal Circuit,
the Supreme Court in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. agreed that
"the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent" required it to treat claim construction as the functional equivalent of a
question of law, to be decided by the judge rather than the jury. 125 As a
result, the Federal Circuit reviews claim constructions de novo.126 But as
the critique by Judge O'Malley's panel intimates, the outcome of Federal
Circuit review has been unpredictable.1 2 7 At one time, interpretation depended so heavily on the composition of the panel hearing the appeal,
Professor Polk Wagner ran a website that calculated the probability that
any given panel would employ a particular methodology. 128 Once again,
the court took a case en banc,129 yet little has changed. 130 Not only is it
difficult for inventors and businesses to predict the scope of a claim, it is
also hard for judges-including district court judges with substantial experience in patent law-to anticipate the Federal Circuit's
interpretation.131
The bottom line is in some ways the worst of all worlds. There is
stronger public interest in substantive content than the proceduralists
predicted, 132 but the goal of uniformity has not been achieved. 133 Moreover, the lack of uniformity is of a particularly pernicious sort. Disuniformity in the regional circuits does not entirely undermine
predictability because the geographic scope of each court's authority usu124. See, e.g., Sona De, The Inequitable Conduct Defense: Before and After Therasense,

INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Sept. 2012, at 15, 15-16; Dashiell Milliman-Jarvis, The State of

Ethical Duties After Therasense, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 695, 710 (2012).
125. 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996).
126. Vitrionics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
127. O'Malley, supra note 116, at 680-81; see, e.g., Vitrionics, 90 F.3d at 1581-83
(describing the kinds of evidence judges rely on). See generally Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim
Construction,Appeal, and the Predictabilityof Interpretive Strategies, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1033 (2007).
128. See The Federal Circuit Predictor, CLAIMCONSTRUCTION.COM, http://predictor

.claimconstruction.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
129. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
130. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Jurisprudence33 (Univ. of Pa. Law
Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Paper No. 11-27), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstractid=1909028. The advent of new judges may further destabilize claim
construction. See, e.g., Aventis Pharms. Inc. v. Amino Chems., Ltd., 715 F.3d 1363, 1373,
1377-81 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (featuring an opinion by Judge Reyna and a dissent by Judge
Bryson directed, in part, to the effect of prosecution history).
131. David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MIcH. L. REv. 223, 226 n.7 (2008) (quoting
District Court Judge Marsha J. Pechman as stating that the Federal Circuit's handling of
these cases makes her think "you might as well throw darts"); see also Mark D. Janis &
Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law's Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 72, 93-100 (2012).
132. See discussion supra notes 95-107.
133. See discussion supra notes 120-31.
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ally makes it possible to determine which law will apply.134 However,
when the disuniformity derives from the composition of particular panels
(as in claim construction) or the point in time when a case reaches the
appellate level (as with inequitable conduct), it is not possible to conform
one's behavior to the dictates of the law.' 35 In addition, it is worth noting
that even though forum shopping at the appellate level decreased with
the establishment of the Federal Circuit, it did not disappear.136 Instead,
it occurs among district courts.' 37
II. WOULD PERCOLATION HELP?
The proceduralists' attack on percolation was aimed at statutory interpretation.138 Thus, it is not surprising that the architects of the Federal
Circuit thought patent law would be a perfect place to experiment.139
Since information is nonrivalrous, the right to exclude is a creature of
statute.140 Furthermore, the myriad technical details in the Patent Act
make it appear to be a comprehensive codification of the law.141
However, the history of the Act belies the notion that patent law is
purely statutory. Much of the current law is built on the patent acts of the
19th century, a time when legislators relied heavily on judges to fill interstices.142 More importantly, the goal of patent law is to encourage newand as Justice Kennedy pointed out in Bilski, unforeseeable-inventions.143 Further, these advances can-as Justice Kennedy suggested in
eBay-alter the "economic function of the patent holder" and thus require modifications in the way the law is applied.144 The legislature could
adapt the law each time the Federal Circuit misinterpreted the statute or
whenever technological innovation required rethinking, but patent law
has never been administered that way.145 Instead, common law development has been the rule. 146 Craig Nard recently canvassed the field and
134. Interstate actors may find it difficult to deal with conflicting rules, but they will not
often be surprised by the law that will be applied in a given case.
135. See discussion supra notes 120-31.
136. Chester S. Chuang, Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of DeclaratoryJudgment to
Forum Shop in Patent Litigation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1065, 1073 n.46 (2012).
137. Id. at 1073-74.
138. See supra notes 20-30.
139. See supra notes 20-30.
140. S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle:
A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1735, 1741-42 (2007).
141. See id. at 1736.
142. Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REv.
51, 68-72 (2010).
143. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227-28 (2010) ("[I]n deciding whether previously unforeseen inventions qualify as patentable 'process[es],' it may not make sense to
require courts to confine themselves to asking the questions posed by the machine-ortransformation test. Section 101's terms suggest that new technologies may call for new
inquiries.").
144. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
145. Nard, supra note 142, at 52-53.
146. Id.
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demonstrated the many ways in which judges have supplied the rules of
decision in patent jurisprudence.14 7 Thus, peripheral claiming started with
the bar and was embraced by the bench as a way to firm up infringement
determinations; the practice was finally codified in 1870.148 Nonobviousness was purely a judge-made doctrine, as were contributory and induced
infringement.149 All three were first codified in 1952.150 Subject matter
eligibility, the doctrine of equivalents, patent misuse, and methodologies
for computing damages were also developed by courts.151 Indeed, these
doctrines have never been fully incorporated into the statute.'52 And new
issues arise continually. For example, both innovation and exploitation
are now dispersed, requiring reallocation of ownership interests-which
were never governed by statute-to reflect collaborative production 53
and reconsideration of "divided infringement" to deal with the ways in
which interactive technologies are used.154
To be sure, many states have specialized courts that work well. The
Delaware Chancery Court, which was in its heyday when the Federal Circuit was created, is a prime example; its expertise in corporate law was
said to have attracted an extraordinary number of firms to incorporate in
Delaware.155 However, what works for states does not necessarily work
for the federal government. Because incorporations are a key source of
business in Delaware, the Delaware legislature has strong incentives to
keep abreast of developments and intercede as soon as problems arise.156
But patent law does not have the same salience in the federal system that
corporate law has in Delaware. As the history of the AIA demonstrates,
congressional response to patent problems can be very slow; despite the
obvious need to conform U.S. law to the law of its trading partners and to
fix various administrative problems in the PTO, it took the legislature six
147. Id. at 77-97; see also Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness
and No Closer to the PromisedLand: Bilski's Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REv. 1289, 1307-11
(2011).
148. Nard, supra note 142, at 69-71.
149. Id. at 72-74 & n.105.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 72, 85, 101-04.
152. An attempt was made to codify the calculation of damages in the lead up to the
AIA. See Josh Friedman, Note, Apportionment: Shining the Light of Day on Patent Damages, 63 CASE W. REs. L. REV., 147, 165-66 & n.110 (2012). It was, however, rejected. See
id.
153. See, e.g., Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1468-72 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (Newman, J., dissenting); Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 672 F.3d 1239,
1243-47 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Aaron X. Fellmeth, Conception and Misconception in Joint Inventorship, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 73, 109, 140-41 (2012).
154. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1305-18 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).
155. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation
Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 280-81 (1985); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76
Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 919-20 (1982).
156. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in
Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 29 (1995).
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years to pass a new statute.' 57
Besides, as Nard argues, in many ways common law development
makes the most sense for patent law.' 5 8 Modern technologies can change
very quickly. Because judges are closer to the patent industries than are
legislators, they are better positioned to develop doctrine that meets each
technology's changing needs and expectations.1 5 9 In fact, congressional
response in the patent realm has tended to be poorly considered. Take for
example the Federal Circuit's expansion of patentable subject matter to
cover business methods.160 Instead of debating the question whether business methods should be patentable, the legislature dealt only with the
impact of these patents (which is to say, it treated the symptoms rather
than examining the possibility of disease).161 To make matters worse, the
Supreme Court then used the new statute to-rather reluctantly-approve business-method patenting.162
Under the current regime, then, elucidation of both statutory provisions and common law doctrines relies entirely on the interaction between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court.163 This could, of
course, be taken as the ideal solution, for it combines judges who possess
expertise with those who possess a generalist perspective. But as we have
seen, it has failed.'"' Over the years, commentators have attributed that
failure to the Federal Circuit itself and to the formalistic way in which it
decides cases and justifies its decisions.165 As I observed in a 2008 article:
[Federal Circuit] opinions rarely provide insight into the goals the
court sees the law as achieving; "policy discussions" take the form of
incantations of standard justifications for statutory terms. Instead,
the court focuses on parsing precedent and on dictionary definitions.
As Judge Alan Lourie recently put it, "[N]ot once have we had a
discussion as to what direction the law should take.... We have just
applied precedent as best we could determine it to the cases that
have come before us." The court, in short, fails to instill confidence
in its decisions because it rarely tests the accuracy of its positions by
157. David W. Trilling, Recognizing a Need for Reform: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 239, 241 (2012); Ryan Vacca, Acting
Like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 Mo. L. REv. 733, 752-53
(2011).
158. Nard, supra note 142, at 56, 99-106.
159. Id. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography,85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1444 (2010)
(arguing that trial judges are even closer to technological communities).
160. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-77
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (approving patents on business methods).
161. See 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (Supp. V 2011) (outlining a prior user right for those practicing business methods prior to the filing of the patent application).
162. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228-29 (2010) (rejecting an exclusion for business methods based on then § 273(b)); see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or
Dead-HandControl? PatentableSubject Matterfor Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski, 3
CASE W. REs. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 3-5 (2012).
163. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of InstitutionalIdentity: The Federal Circuit
Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 806-10 (2008).
164. See id.
165. Id. at 808-09.
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trying to explain them. 166
In that piece, I also attributed the Federal Circuit's insistence on formalism and its refusal to consider policy to a desire to establish credibility
during its formative years when it was "on probation" in the public's
mind. 167
The court has now passed its probationary period and has, in fact, become somewhat more forthcoming. At least since Festo, when an en banc
decision featuring multiple dissents attracted Supreme Court attention,168
the Federal Circuit's judges have become adept at airing the choices the
court faces, the advantages of particular positions, and the relevance of
cognate bodies of law.169 Furthermore, consistent with a suggestion I
made in 2004 to broaden the court's experience, Federal Circuit judges
have begun to sit on other circuits, and the court has invited visiting
judges to participate in its decisionmaking.170 Yet these changes have had
little impact on outcomes. Since Festo, the Supreme Court reversed or
substantially modified the vast majority of the Federal Circuit decisions it
reviewed.
If the problem cannot be attributed solely to the Federal Circuit's formalism (which actually mirrors the preferred methodology of several Supreme Court justices), then it is time to consider whether the
proceduralists who founded the court were wrong to dismiss the role of
percolation. After all, federal law is not typically the product of a dialogue between two courts hierarchically related to one another. Perhaps
the drafters of the Evarts Act implicitly recognized important truths that
in a country as complex as the United States, the adjudicatory system is
stronger when courts have overlapping jurisdiction and the independence
to question one another, modify each other's outcomes, and resolve similar issues differently; that the Supreme Court benefits from-and depends upon-this activity; and that percolation provides important
information to Congress.
166. Id. (citations omitted). See generally Peter Lee, Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit: The Jurisprudence of Chief Judge Rader, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 405 (2012)
(noting that Judge Rader is much more sensitive to context, but agreeing that his colleagues are formalistic in their approach); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003).
167. Dreyfuss, supra note 163, at 815-17; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 803 & n.70
(quoting Federal Circuit judges' statements on their unwillingness to engage in policy
discussions).
168. See Duffy, supra note 34, at 11-12.
169. See, e.g., Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1311-14
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (generating three opinions dealing with divided
infringement claims, all arguing about the relative weight to be accorded to tort, criminal,
and copyright law); id. at 1308, 1311, 1325, 1328-30 (Newman, J., dissenting); id. at 1343-48
(Linn, J., dissenting); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en
banc) (consulting criminal law cases on the application of the work-product privilege).
170. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The FederalCircuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 769, 793-96 (2004); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking
Federal Circuit Jurisdiction,100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1470-73 (2012).
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Percolation certainly appears to be important as new issues work their
way "up" to the Supreme Court. As Fred Schauer has theorized, it is not
just hard cases that make bad law; all cases (including statutory cases) can
do it.171 The salience of specific facts can distort the judges' thinking, and
once a bad rule is adopted, the court will have trouble altering it.172 The
facts of the first case anchor consideration of later cases, and the rule
initially adopted frames all future discussion.173 Anticipating these difficulties, litigants can become reluctant to even argue for change.174 The
Federal Circuit's 2002 decision in Madey v. Duke University is a perfect
illustration of Schauer's theory: the facts-a fired university professor suing his university for patent infringement-were odd and led the court to
severely restrict the scope of the common law experimental use exemption. 175 The ruling is so potentially disruptive of research, it has induced
firms to establish research arms outside the United States.176 Arguably, it
has also driven Justice Breyer's concern over patenting research inputs.' 77
And yet a decade has gone by and no one has risked raising the scope of
the exemption again.' 78
Schauer focused on adjudication by individual courts and did not consider the effects of percolation.179 Arguably, dialogue among tribunals
can make a significant difference. Thus, all courts may well suffer similar
cognitive problems. However, unless the facts of the first case in each
court are systematically skewed in the same direction, the salience,
anchoring, and framing effects with which Schauer was concerned could
wash out, at least partially.180 Furthermore, as Craig Nard and John
Duffy have argued, each tribunal produces information that the litigants
can use in successive cases and each decision spurs them to develop more
creative arguments.' 8 ' Any one forum's legal conclusions might be "bad
law," but the collective outcome may converge on a better (if not the
171. Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. Cm. L. REV. 883, 884-85
(2006).
172. Id. at 900-01.
173. Id. at 901-05.
174. Id. at 910-11.
175. 307 F.3d 1351, 1352-53, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see Schauer, supra note 171, at
884-85.
176. See Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(permitting the data acquired offshore from unauthorized patent use to be imported into
the United States); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Arbitrage:How ForeignRules
Can Affect Domestic Protections, 71 U. Cm. L. REV. 223, 227 (2004).
177. See supra notes 53-56.
178. See Roy Zwahlen, Mayo v. Prometheus: Thought Leaders Express Concern and
Evaluate the Impact, BIOTEcHNow (June 21, 2012), http://www.biotech-now.org/publicpolicy/patently-biotechl2012/05/mayo-v-prometheus-thought-leaders-express-concern-eval
uate-business-impact-and-discuss-the-future. The issue could have been raised in Integra
Lifesciences I., Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, but instead the defendant made a somewhat farfetched (but in the end successful) argument for extending the statutory exception of 35
U.S.C. § 271(e). 496 F.3d 1334, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
179. See Schauer, supra note 171, at 890-906.
180. See id. at 894-99.
181. Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle,
101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1619, 1633 (2007).
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"right") rule. 182 If divergence in the form of a circuit split nonetheless
persists, then, as Justice Stevens noted in Holmes, that signals to the Supreme Court that the issue merits review. 183
When the issue reaches the Court, the percolation that occurred below
can also improve the Justices' consideration. The varying decisions of the
lower courts can be understood as furnishing a rating system (a species of
crowdsourcing).1 84 While it would be wrong for the Supreme Court to
simply adopt the most popular opinion, the Court can derive important
information from the fact that several courts have confronted the same
problem or resolved the same legal issue in similar ways. Consider, for
example, the problem that began in Dennison, where, in a short per
curiam issued without benefit of argument, the Supreme Court demanded that the Federal Circuit adhere to the dictates of Rule 52(a)
when reviewing findings of facts.18 5 Dennison led the Federal Circuit to
classify many important matters as questions of law to invoke de novo
review and thus retain control over outcomes. 18 6 But that practice has led
to many reversals and retrials, to the aforementioned demoralization of
the trial courts, and to dissents on what should be considered an issue of
fact or law. 187 Indeed, in claim construction cases, the Federal Circuit has
twice considered the standard of review en banc.188 Perhaps the Court
would have been more deliberative had there been other specialized
courts grappling with the same problem of reviewing lay factfinding. Significantly, when it came to the converse problem of lay judges reviewing
expert administrative action, the Supreme Court developed the Chevron
doctrine and a series of nuanced standards on the degree of deference
owed in particular circumstances.1 89 These standards largely address
182. See id. The argument about whether the common law evolves toward efficiency is
an old one. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 98 (1st ed. 1972);
Daniel Klerman, JurisdictionalCompetition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1182-83 (2007); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on
Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 63, 63-65 (1989). The claim here is not that the resulting law is efficient, but rather than the outcome of multicourt dialogue can be an improvement over law developed by a single court, subject to another single tribunal's review.
183. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 838-39
(2002) (Stevens, J., concurring).
184. See generally BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI GOVERNMENT: How TECHNOLOGY
CAN MAKE GOVERNMENT BETTER, DEMOCRACY STRONGER, AND CITIZENS MORE PowERFUL 14, 18, 181 (2009) (describing various uses of crowdsourcing in governmental
activities).
185. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 810-11 (1986) (per curiam).
186. See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454-55 (1998) (en banc).
187. See Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 701 F.3d 1351, 1353-54,
1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (featuring a dissent by Judge Moore, joined by Chief
Judge Rader and Judges O'Malley, Reyna, and Wallach on whether the issue was one of
law meriting de novo review); see also Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1454-55; Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1004-06 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 932 (2013).
188. See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455 (en banc); Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips
Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 500 Fed. App'x 951, 951-52 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (order granting en banc
review).

189. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984);
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
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problems confronting the D.C. Circuit, but the D.C. Circuit was not alone
in reviewing administrative agencies, and that may have contributed to
the Supreme Court's sense that an extended analysis was needed when
review occurs under conditions of knowledge asymmetry.190
Prior percolation can also help the Supreme Court craft its own approach. Although the Court usually takes only one case raising a particular issue at a time, it is surely aware of the other cases dealing with the
same question. These cases can reduce the salience, anchoring, and framing effects of the reviewed case and thus diminish cognitive distortion.
And because the reviewed court will often have considered prior courts'
resolutions, its decision will usually provide the Justices with an understanding of the reason it deviated. Had, for example, several courts faced
the question of determining when a process constitutes patentable subject
matter, the machine or transformation test would have been more widely
discussed; some courts might have made improvements or developed different approaches. Justice Kennedy would presumably have had the same
concerns he articulated in Bilski, but with more approaches to consider,
the Court might have had an easier time developing a principle for deciding when processes are too abstract to be patented.191 Experience under
varying rules also provides empirical evidence of how well particular dispositions work in practice and the problems they can cause. 192
Percolation may be even more important on the way "down" from the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is very good at articulating norms
and identifying policy considerations that the lower courts did not consider or properly weigh. However, it often leaves the hard work of implementing its approach to further development below.193 In the context of
the Federal Circuit, this is a real problem. First, it is difficult for any court
to figure out how to implement a standard with which it does not agree,
and that is especially true, as it often is with the Federal Circuit, when an
en banc (rather than a circuit split) was the signal to grant certiorari. In
such cases, every judge suffers from anchoring and framing effects; each
has already debated the issue with everyone else on the court and staked
out a public position. Second, because the Federal Circuit is more specialized than the Supreme Court, its judges can become intellectually complacent (some might call it arrogant) about whose resolution is correct.194
190. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.
191. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225-29 (2010).
192. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1366-67, 1389-90 (2013).
Kirtsaeng raised the question whether copyright law recognizes an international exhaustion
doctrine. To decide, the Court compared the experience in circuits that had adopted opposing approaches. See id. at 1366-67; id. at 1389-90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
193. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8
(1997) ("We leave it to the Federal Circuit how best to implement procedural improvements to promote certainty, consistency, and reviewability to this area of the law.").
194. See generally Lucas S. Osborn, Instrumentalism at the FederalCircuit,56 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 419 (2012) (describing the ways the Federal Circuit minimizes the Supreme Court's
impact).
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The result is not a happy one. For example, in KSR InternationalCo. v.
Teleflex Inc., the case on inventiveness (nonobviousness), the Supreme
Court rejected the Federal Circuit's teaching, suggestion, and motivation
test as overly rigid.195 It also warned the Federal Circuit that ordinary
artisans are not automatons and can be expected to exercise a degree of
creativity. 196 The Court's goal was to raise the degree of inventiveness
required to merit protection, yet the Federal Circuit's Chief Judge has
repeatedly assured the public that KSR has changed nothing. 197
The Federal Circuit was even less receptive to the patentable subject
matter cases. As former Chief Judge Michel said in connection with
Mayo: "There's a certain amount of .

.

. suspicion that there might be

some deeper immersion, deeper familiarity, harder thinking and greater
exposure [to patent law] at the Federal Circuit than the Supreme Court
itself can offer."1 98 Indeed, certiorari was granted in Myriad twice-the
second time because the Federal Circuit essentially ignored the Supreme
Court's remand to reconsider it in light of the decision in Mayo.199
In other federal law areas, the reviewed court may be equally uninterested in altering its approach, or the judges may be equally unable to
escape their priors. However, there are always other courts in the system
that are intellectually freer to consider the Supreme Court's guidance and
turn decisions into operable rules. There are, as John Golden put it, more
courts available to explore "plausible paths for doctrinal development." 200 Later development may produce a uniform rule. If not, it creates an empirical basis for the Supreme Court to return to the issue and
clarify the doctrine.
Even if statutory law is conceived of as different from pure common
law and Congress stays abreast of developments, percolation would be
helpful, for it would signal the need for the legislature to step in. Tax law
furnishes a good example. Courts, long interested in preventing taxpayers
from engaging in transactions that have no aim other than to subvert the
tax code, adopted the economic substance doctrine. 201 The appellate
courts developed several approaches, and after years of refinement, Congress stepped in and used the debate as the basis for codifying a new
rule. 20 2 For patent law, the benefits of such an approach are evident. Con195. 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).
196. Id. at 420-22.
197. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Chief Judge Rader Says KSR Didn't Change Anything, I
Disagree, IP WATCHDOG (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/10/06/chiefjudge-rader-says-ksr-didnt-change-anything-i-disagreeid=19603/.
198. Zwahlen, supra note 178.
199. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), decision reinstated, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2012), cert. granted sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 694 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Similarly, the grant in Festo was required because the circuit
evaded the dictates of Warner-Jenkinson.See 535 U.S. 722, 729 (2002).
200. Golden, supra note 33, at 673.
201. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 468-70 (1935).
202. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
§ 1409(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1067-68 (codified at I.R.C. § 7701(o)); see Martin J. McMahon,
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sider claim construction. As noted earlier, the Federal Circuit has been
heavily criticized for its failure to develop an approach that would make
the meaning of claims more predictable. 20 3 Under current law, however,
the task may be insoluble. Thus, Jeanne Fromer argues that the current
practice of peripheral claiming does not comport with the way that information is processed. 204 Starting with the notion that people learn more
from exemplars than from metes and bounds, she has proposed a variation on central claiming that would also require patentees to provide
many examples. 205 Federal Circuit Judge Plager has a different solution:
he would reorganize the PTO and give it control over claim interpretation. 206 Both solutions would require legislative intervention. 2 07 Had
many courts failed at finding a predictable way to interpret claims, Congress might have taken up the issue when it enacted the AIA. But currently, it is easier to blame the Federal Circuit. To put it another way,
Congress may be reluctant to pay the political price of change when a
problem can be resolved through the action of a single appellate court.
Admittedly, after thirty years it is easy to forget the horrors of forum
shopping. However, experience over these years suggests that uniform
law and good law are not, as the architects of the Federal Circuit assumed, the same and that a two-court dialogue is not enough to develop a
coherent or accurate regime. Circuit law is improved through multiple
considerations of the same legal issue in a variety of factual contexts and
through discussion among hierarchically independent courts. The Supreme Court relies on percolation in its decisions on when to take a case
and during its deliberation. Moreover, successful implementation is dependent on debate and revision in multiple venues. The question, then, is
how to restore percolation to the system.
III.

CAN PERCOLATION BE RESTORED WITHOUT
SACRIFICING UNIFORMITY?

Others have addressed the percolation issue. As we saw, Congress gave
the Federal Circuit case rather than issue jurisdiction, which requires it to
consider legal questions that can also arise in the regional courts. 208 Further, the Supreme Court attempted to insert the Federal Circuit into the
appellate court dialogue by insisting that it consider doctrinal developJr., et al., Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation: The Year 2011, 12 FLA. TAX
REv. 235, 362-68 (2012) (citing cases from the Tax Court and the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth,
and Federal Circuits); see also PAUL R. McDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1229-62 (6th ed. 2008) (providing a broader account, including
contributions from other appellate courts).
203. See supra notes 125-31.
204. Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 719, 763-65
(2009).
205. Id.
206. Plager & Pettigrew, supra note 140, at 1746-47.
207. See Fromer, supra note 204, at 763-65; Plager & Pettigrew, supra note 140, at
1746-47.
208. See supra note 13.
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ments in other areas when construing patent law. 2 0 9 While both strategies
could broaden the judges' perspective, neither is likely to lead to a fruitful
interchange. Practically since its inception, the Federal Circuit has eschewed serious consideration of nonpatent questions. Rather than debate
issues arising in other fields, it has instead applied the law of the circuit
from which the case arose. 210 That approach appears to be based on an
analogy to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, which requires federal courts
to apply state law to state issues arising in federal cases. 2 11 But as I have
argued elsewhere, the analogy is misguided in that circuits are not like
states. They are not sovereign entities with sovereign-and sole-power
to determine the law of their territories. 2 12 Until the Federal Circuit
comes into alignment with practice under the Evarts Act and makes its
own independent determination of all open questions of federal law, patent jurisprudence is unlikely to benefit significantly from the dialogic
processes envisioned by Congress and the Supreme Court. An example is
Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., where the Federal
Circuit nominally based its approach to divided infringement on the law
on joint tortfeasors. 2 13 But according to the dissent and commentators,
the court largely misconceived the doctrine. 214
In a 2009 article, John Golden suggested that the Supreme Court
should alter its practices to become the "prime percolator" in patent
law. 2 1 5 In Golden's view, the original instinct of the Federal Circuit's architects was largely correct: intervention by the Supreme Court often substitutes a generalist-and possibly uninformed-view for the expert
resolution of a specialized bench. 216 But Golden would not entirely eliminate the Supreme Court from the system.217 Rather, he would have it
review cases only when it appears the law is ossified and could use a dose
of "creative disruption." 2 1 8 He would therefore limit certiorari to situations where the substantive question was no longer being debated by the
Federal Circuit judges; there is reason in the form of empirical research
by outside parties to think that the Federal Circuit's rule is suboptimal;
and the case presents a good vehicle for addressing the issue. 219
This approach clearly has the advantage of reducing tension between
209. See supra notes 42-47.
210. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Grp., 747 F.2d 1422, 1437-40 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en
banc) (applying the law of the circuit of origin to the non-patent issue in the case).
211. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
212. Dreyfuss, supra note 170, at 788-91.
213. 692 F.3d 1301, 1311-13 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc).
214. See id. at 1328-30 (Newman, J., dissenting); Lynda J. Oswald, Unexpected Hazards
of a Specialized PatentCourt: Lessons from JointInfringement Doctrine, in THE CHANGING
FACE OF U.S. PATENT LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON BUSINESS STRATEGY (Daniel R. Cahoy &
Lynda J. Oswald eds., 2013).
215. Golden, supra note 33, at 709.
216. Id. at 688-89.
217. Id. at 709.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 710-13.

530

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

the two courts. 220 Further, it would preserve the benefits that accrue from
the Federal Circuit's expertise. 221 However, it is not responsive to the
concerns discussed above. 222 The core frustration is not with ossification
but with the court's vacillation and, even more, with rigid rules that are
not adaptable to new technologies or to new business models and do not
take account of the public's interest in access. 223 It is also hard to square
Golden's concern for ossification with his belief that the Federal Circuit
can act as a "second percolator" in its attempts to implement the Supreme Court's guidance. 224 As we saw, once the court digs in, it becomes
less willing to search for new solutions.225
Craig Nard and John Duffy proposed a different approach. 226 Starting
from the premise that decisionmaking authority over patent law suffers
from excess centralization and institutionalized parochialism, they would
reestablish "competitive jurispruden[ce]" by empowering one other circuit to hear patent appeals from the district courts and by giving the D.C.
Circuit shared responsibility over appeals from the PTO. 2 2 7 That, they
say, would introduce administrative and regulatory expertise into the system, force the Federal Circuit to write persuasively, restore the signaling
effect of circuit splits, and foster dialogue on implementing Supreme
Court precedent. 228 At the same time, this system would give the judges
on each court enough patent cases to develop expertise. 229
It is hard to argue with Nard and Duffy's diagnosis of the problem; it is
very close to my own. However, their proposal raises many problems.
Treating PTO and district court appeals differently would risk recreating
the "notorious differences" in standards that the Federal Circuit was
partly designed to eliminate. 230 Assigning appeals from trial courts to
more than one circuit could also foster forum shopping. The drafters
could eliminate that problem by assigning appeals randomly, 2 31 but random assignment would create the same pernicious form of disuniformity
discussed earlier. 232 In addition, Nard and Duffy claim that disuniformity
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id.; supra Part I.
223. See supra Part I.
224. See Golden, supra note 33, at 719.
225. See supra notes 193-99.
226. Nard & Duffy, supra note 181, at 1625, 1649, 1653-54, 1661-62.
227. Id. at 1625, 1649-50. For analogous proposals, see Gugliuzza, supra note 170, at
1500 (suggesting random assignment of regional circuit cases to the Federal Circuit and
consolidating the Federal Circuit with the D.C. Circuit). Judge Diane Wood of the Seventh
Circuit has also been concerned with the Federal Circuit's isolation and its failure to consider countervailing interests. She would expand the number of courts hearing patent cases
by giving the appellant a choice between the Federal Circuit and the regional circuit with
jurisdiction over the district court from which the case arose. See Diane P. Wood, Is It Time
to Abolish the Federal Circuit's Exclusive Jurisdictionin Patent Cases?, 13 Cm. KENT L.
REv. 1, 9 (2013).
228. Nard & Duffy, supra note 181, at 1653-54, 1661-62.
229. See id. at 1636.
230. See discussion supra note 6.
231. Nard & Duffy, supra note 181, at 1668-69.
232. See supra notes 120-37.

2013]

Percolation, Uniformity, and Coherent Adjudication

531

is not a problem for other intellectual property areas and suggest that
where there are potential problems, courts will likely choose to converge
on similar rules. 2 3 3 However, neither argument is persuasive. In other areas, disuniformity is geographic. 2 34 Because actors know where they are
operating, they can usually predict the applicable law (and in contracts,
they can specify it). Further, the more exogenous pressure on the courts
to agree, the less likely that their interchange will improve the law significantly enough to offset the costs of changing the appellate structure. 2 35
Finally, two voices may not be enough to dissipate the cognitive biases
that make decisionmaking by a single court so worrisome.
The Golden article and the Nard and Duffy piece were published prior
to several significant modifications in the administration of patent law.
Organizational changes at the PTO have given the Office more authority;2 36 at the trial court level, a pilot program is fostering expertise among
district court judges;237 and internationally, patent law is converging.238
Each of these changes creates new opportunities for dialogue. Whether
interchange among these entities can duplicate the benefits of percolation
depends, in part, on what are seen as the advantages of percolation. Regional circuits do more than take different approaches to the law, they
also generate data on the way that differing rules work in practice. Percolation within regional circuits works well because each court binds only
one part of the country. In contrast, the PTO's rules apply nationally and,
since it has never received Chevron deference, the Federal Circuit can
always substitute a different (and equally national) rule. District court
decisions do apply in particular geographic areas. But since the Federal
Circuit undertakes de novo review of legal questions, its determinations
(once again) bind the nation as a whole.
To some extent, foreign courts could duplicate the true percolation experience, but there are problems here as well. Because there are many
background differences, comparisons must be made cautiously. Furthermore, the United States has so little appetite for following foreign law,
judges who have cited it have been threatened with impeachment. 239
Nonetheless, there are several ways to take advantage of each of these
possibilities.
233. Nard & Duffy, supra note 181, at 1650, 1668-72.
234. See id.
235. Plager and Pettigrew have also critiqued the Nard and Duffy approach, but they
do so largely for the reasons the proceduralists of the 1980s favored the elimination of
percolation-because patent law is purely statutory. Plager & Pettigrew, supra note 140, at
1736.
236. See discussion infra notes 240-63
237. See discussion infra notes 264-81.
238. See discussion infra notes 282-303.
239. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Resumes His Call for Judicial Independence, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/01/politics/0lscotus
.html; David J. Seipp, Our Law, Their Law, History, and the Citation of Foreign Law, 86
B.U. L. REV. 1417, 1417 (2006).
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1. The PTO. Before arriving at their proposal to split appeals between
the Federal Circuit and other courts, Nard and Duffy considered the PTO
as a potential "peer competitor," arguing that in a sense the PTO already
performs that role in that it advises the Solicitor General, it uses notice
and comment rulemaking to draft the guidelines used by both examiners
and applicants, and its adjudicatory decisions denying patents are given
deference. 240 Ultimately, however, the lack of rulemaking authority, and
hence the lack of Chevron deference, led Nard and Duffy to reject that
approach. 2 41 At the time, there were other reasons to be concerned about
PTO decisionmaking. The agency's funding depended entirely on the
number of patents granted and maintained, and Congress periodically enhanced the financial pressure by diverting fees to the Treasury. 242 With
one minor exception, proceedings were ex parte, and gave the PTO no
opportunity to hear from entities opposing patent protection. 24 3 Furthermore, the PTO saw patents only at the application stage and had no way
to observe their effects in product or research markets. 244
Developments in the last few years have, however, significantly
burnished the PTO's institutional stature. In 2010, the PTO established
the Office of the Chief Economist to conduct economic analyses of intellectual property protection, including enforcement issues, and to provide
a broad perspective on the impact of patents and their value relative to
other forms of intellectual property. 24 5 At around the same time, the
PTO appointed a Chief Policy Officer and Director for International Affairs. 246 In 2011, Congress also made important changes. Under the AIA,
anyone can submit prior art to the PTO during examination and seek
post-grant review in the first nine months after a patent is issued. 247 Congress also expanded inter partes revieW248 and enacted a special provision
to challenge business method patents. 24 9 In addition, the legislature gave
the PTO fee-setting authority and promised to refrain from diverting
240. Nard & Duffy, supra note 181, at 1640-41; see, e.g., Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 161-62 (1999).
241. Nard & Duffy, supra note 181, at 1640-41.
242. See, e.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect
Decisionmaking?:An Empirical Assessment of the PTO's Granting Patterns,66 VAND. L.
REv. 67,72-75 (2013); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: PropertyRights for Business Concepts and PatentSystem Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 577, 589-91 (1999).
243. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-318 (2006) (amended 2012). Prior to the AIA, there was an
option for inter partes review, however it was available in limited circumstances. See id.
§ 311(a). Because it estopped parties from later raising any claim that could have been
raised in the proceeding, it was used sparingly. See id. § 315(c).
244. See id. § 148.
245. Office of the Chief Economist, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/ip/offlcechiefecon/in

dex.jsp (last modified Feb. 1, 2013).

246. Shira Perimutter, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/about/bios/bio-perlmutter.jsp
(last modified Sept. 20, 2012).
247. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301, 321, 324 (Supp. V 2011).
248. Id. §§ 311-319.
249. 37 C.F.R. § 42.301 (2012).
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fees. 250
Turning the PTO into a convincingly neutral forum will take time. Its
first foray into policy analysis is something of a paean to intellectual property rights, with little effort made to consider other incentives to innovate
or the costs of strong protection. 25 1 The PTO also missed a congressional
deadline to produce a report on access to genetic testing. 252 Crucially, the
PTO still lacks substantive rulemaking authority. 253 Indeed, the Federal
Circuit has gone out of its way to "agree" with the PTO, rather than to
"defer" to its decisions. 254
Still, as the Office regularizes the process of basing its decisions on notice and comment rulemaking and on studies by the Chief Economist's
Office, greater respect will be arguably warranted. The PTO's new financial structure will make it more independent of patent applicants, and the
new review procedures will, for the first time, focus significant attention
on the views of those opposing patents. In fact, standing in the post-grant
review context is so broad that the PTO could find itself entertaining
cases brought by individuals and public interest groups that could not be
heard in court. 255 Importantly, the Federal Circuit cannot discount the
PTO on the ground of lesser expertise; technologically, the examiner
corps is probably better educated than the judges of the Federal Circuit.2 5 6 Furnished with both the PTO's views and more compelling decisions by the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court will be better positioned
to choose cases and develop its own views. Involving the PTO in implementing the Supreme Court's rules will also leaven the inertia produced
by the Federal Circuit's tendency to adhere to prior positions.
It might even be possible to generate some of the experiential benefits
of intercircuit percolation. First, the Federal Circuit could allow a PTO
rule to stand for a period of time before it considers reversing. Delay
would increase the number of factual contexts in which a rule is consid250. 35 U.S.C. § 41 (enacted on Sept. 16, 2012); id. § 42 (enacted on Jan. 14, 2013),
(H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary) (June 21, 2011), http://judiciary.house.gov/news/06212011
.html.
251. ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN. & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES INFOCUs (2012), available at http://
www.uspto.gov/news/publications/IPReportMarch_2012.pdf.
252. See AIA Studies and Reports, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/aia implementation/
aia-studiesreports.jsp#heading-3 (last modified Apr. 3, 2013).
253. See Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power Over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907, 907-08 (2004). Significantly, Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick
Leahy would have given the PTO rule-making authority. See Patent Reform Act of 2006, S.
3818, 109th Cong. § 315(a) (2006).
254. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing and agreeing with
the PTO's Utility Examination Guidelines); see also Nard & Duffy, supra note 181, at
1640-41.
255. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 321(a) ("[A] person who is not the owner of a patent may
file . . . a petition to institute a post-grant review."), with MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (requiring adversarial legal interests and a controversy of
"sufficient immediacy and reality").
256. See Patent Examiner Positions, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/
exam.htm (last modified Nov. 16, 2003) (requiring examiners to have at a minimum a bachelor's degree in physical science, life science, engineering discipline, or computer science).
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ered and allow the court to assess the rule's impact. While such a procedure would introduce temporal disuniformity, the court could mitigate
the cost by forewarning the patent community when its acceptance of a
PTO position is conditioned on subsequent experience. Moreover, the
court could adopt rules on retroactivity that are sensitive to the impact of
change. 257
Second, the court could capitalize on the PTO's recent decision to open
satellite offices in San Jose, Detroit, Dallas-Fort Worth, and Denver. 258
Jeanne Fromer has documented the extent to which firms in related fields
tend to cluster geographically. 259 If that is so, then each of these offices
will examine patents in distinct fields-such as software in San Jose and
automotive inventions in Denver. 260 If courts were to give greater deference to decisions by satellite offices regarding inventions in their specialized fields, the system could experiment with different rules for different
technologies. Obviously, this process would also create a measure of disuniformity. But Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argue that patent law should
be viewed as including a series of policy levers that allow doctrines to be
customized to the problems facing specific industries. 26 1 In some cases,
the Federal Circuit (or Supreme Court) might decide that Burk and Lemley are correct and leave tailored rules in effect; in other situations, the
judges might ultimately decide that a particular rule works so well, it
should be generalized to other fields. 2 6 2 Since parties know the general
field of their inventions, technology-based disuniformity does not raise
the problems posed by either temporal or geographic differences. 263
2. District Courts. Although dialogue with the PTO could provide the
Federal Circuit with a new perspective, the interchanges between the
court and the PTO will not be sufficient to fully inform the development
of patent law. Apart from the work of the Chief Economist, the PTO
does not have occasion to opine on issues that arise after a claim is found
valid, including the doctrine of equivalents, theories of liability, defenses,
or remedies. As a result, there would not be dialogue on these issues.
257. Cf Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41-42 (1997)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (suggesting that the court pay attention to the plight of the "patentee who had no notice [of the new rule] at the time of patent prosecution").
258. Press Release, U.S. Commerce Department to Open FourRegional U.S. PatentOffices that Will Speed Up the Patent Process and Help American Businesses Innovate, Grow,
and Create Jobs, USPTO (July 2, 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2012/12-40.jsp.
259. Fromer, supra note 159, at 1444, 1481, 1498-1506.
260. See id.
261. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv.
1575, 1579 (2003).
262. See id.
263. Arguably, technology-based differences violate Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, which requires nondiscrimination as to field of technology. See Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit
Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81. But see Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Diversifying Without Discriminating:Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 445, 449-51 (2007) (arguing that member

states do not violate TRIPS when they enact laws addressing problems intrinsic to a
technology).
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More important, the limits on PTO involvement render the system less
able to consider the interaction between post- and pre-grant issues. Take,
for example, Justice Breyer's concern about patents on scientific inputs
impeding technological progress. 2M That problem could be solved with
strong limitations on what is considered patentable subject matter (as he
favors) or by expanding the scope of the research defense (by revising
Madey).265 Because PTO examination and review can focus only on the
first issue., it cannot easily provide insight into which route would be more
effective at spurring innovation.
District courts could, however, take up the slack. The Federal Circuit's
perceived superior expertise in technological matters has led it to classify
key issues as questions of law which it then reviews de novo.2 6 6 But that
difference may soon fade, at least in part. In addition to enacting the
AIA, Congress made another important change in 2011: it launched the
Patent Cases Pilot Program. 267 Under this initiative, fourteen districts, all
in places where high-tech industries are located, were chosen to experiment with a new approach to case distribution. 26 8 Cases filed in each of
these districts will be assigned to its judges randomly. 269 However, judges
who are disinterested in patent law can transfer their patent cases to
judges who volunteer, and are designated, to hear them. 270 Presumably,
the volunteers will be jurists who are interested in the field and have facility with technical material. 27 1
The main thrust of the program is to encourage the development of
efficient case management techniques. 272 But just as concentration gave
the judges of the Federal Circuit more technological expertise, so too
should this program. 273 In fact, if Fromer is right about clustering, the
designated judges may become even more expert than the jurists on the
Federal Circuit. 274 As cases in specific technological areas are concentrated before the designated judges, the judges should develop the kind
of closeness to technology communities that Nard saw as important to the
264. See supra notes 86-93.
265. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1360-62 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
266. See, e.g., supra note 126.
267. See Pub. L. No. 111-349, § 1, 124 Stat. 3674, 3674-76 (2011).
268. District Courts Selected for Patent Pilot Program, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://
www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/11-06-01/DistrictCourtsSelectedforPatentPilotProgram.aspx (last visited July 22, 2013). The selected district courts are: Eastern District of New York, Southern District of New York,
Western District of Pennsylvania, District of New Jersey, District of Maryland, Northern
District of Illinois, Southern District of Florida, District of Nevada, Eastern District of
Texas, Northern District of Texas, Western District of Tennessee, Central District of California, Northern District of California, and the Southern District of California. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See id.
272. See 14 District Courts Selected for Patent Pilot Program, IP SPOTLIGHT (June 9,
2011), http://ipspotlight.com/201 1/06/09/14-district-courts-selected-for-patent-pilotprogram.
273. See Fromer, supra note 159, at 1455-58.
274. See id. at 1447.
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development of the common law. 2 7 5 Of course, these judges will not have
the PTO's experience in claim drafting or examination, but they will see
patents in the context of litigation and over the life cycle of innovation.
The pilot program provides the impetus for developing a new approach
to review of trial court decisions. In a series of dissents on claim construction, Judge Rader has argued that the Markman decision to allocate claim
interpretation to the bench does not imply that interpretive issues must
be decided de novo. 2 7 6 He would instead create a rule of "appropriate
deference" based on the same functional analysis that the Supreme Court
adopted in Markman.277 That formulation could be used to develop a
general approach to appellate review. 2 7 8 In particular, the Federal Circuit
(as well as other district courts) should give special consideration to decisions by seasoned designated judges, especially when they are deciding
cases in the fields where local industries have specializations. Greater deference would, of course, not eliminate the possibility of reversing a designated judge's determinations. But a presumption of deference would
require the Federal Circuit to offer an extended justification for reversal.
With the output of an expert district court and the Federal Circuit available, the Supreme Court would have better guidance in its own decisionmaking, and there would be more minds engaged at the implementation
phase. The morale of the district court judges might even improve.
As with the PTO's satellite offices, the pilot program also offers an
opportunity for experimentation across technologies. Indeed, the two initiatives are synergistic: a rule adopted by a designated district judge in
connection with a patent issued in a satellite office with expertise in the
field of the invention ought to be entitled to considerable respect by
other trial courts, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court. Of course,
where the work of a particular designated judge is left in place, there will
be some disuniformity. But if Burk and Lemley are correct, the disuniformity will be of a benign, if not advantageous, sort. 27 9 As noted
above, technological differences are, in any case, relatively easy for the
patent industries to take into account. 280 If problems continue, a single
rule could be adopted, or venue rules could be changed. 281
3. Foreign courts. Zorina Khan has argued that patent law was made a
federal right out of "concern with fostering interstate commerce and national markets." 282 That was in the 18th century. 283 The modern economy
is global; whether a doctrine is "right" is now contingent on the law of
275. See Nard, supra note 142, at 99-105.
276. See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (Rader, J., dissenting in part).
277. Id. at 1478.
278. See id.
279. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 261, at 1577-78.
280. See discussion supra note 263.
281. See, e.g., Fromer,supra note 159, at 1447.
282. B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,

283. Id.

1790-1920, at 69-70 (2005).
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other nations. Madey, for example, might be a reasonable rule for a single
economy, but it presents a problem if other countries permit experimentation with patented inputs and firms respond by taking their research
efforts offshore.2 84 Or consider Akamai, where the Federal Circuit's lack
of tort law experience made it difficult to use doctrines on joint
tortfeasors as the basis for a new approach to divided infringement. 285 As
it happens, Australia has been considering exactly this approach to divided infringement for more than two decades. 286 Surely it would be useful to know how its statute and case law have worked out. And since
divided infringement can occur across jurisdictions, adopting a common
approach could become as important to international actors as uniformity
is within the United States.
Patent judges have long enjoyed informal interchanges; 287 a regular
practice of citing foreign case law would encourage litigants to develop
arguments based on the experiences and practices of jurisdictions with
which the United States trades. The newly established specialized tribunals in other countries-including the Unified Patent Court that may
soon be endowed with exclusive jurisdiction over EU patent rightS2 8 8 means there are courts around the world developing expertise equivalent
to that of the Federal Circuit. Facing similar problems, their dialogue
could be especially fruitful. Indeed, the AIA makes this approach not
only plausible but particularly valuable. One goal of the legislation was to
bring U.S. law into closer conformity with that of its trading partners. 289
As with the law of other nations, priority is to be determined by the first
to file, not the first to invent; 290 novelty and nonobviousness now depend
on filing dates, not invention dates;291 geographic distinctions regarding
the source of prior art have been eliminated; 292 and the best mode requirement is no longer enforceable. 29 3 These changes, and others, raise
many questions new to American law. To the extent the goal is harmonization-and even if it is only internal coherence-it makes sense to consider how jurisdictions that have long operated under similar rules have
284. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
285. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1311-13 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).
286. See, e.g., Ann L. Monotti, Liability for Joint Infringement of a Method Patent
Under Australian Law, 35 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 16 (2013) (comparing Akamai with Australian law).
287. See, e.g., InternationalJudges Conference on Intellectual Property Law, PATENT
Docs (Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.patentdocs.org/2011/04/international-judges-conferenceon-intellectual-property-law.html; Emmanuel Lazega, Mapping Judicial Dialogue Across
National Borders: An ExploratoryNetwork Study of Learningfrom Lobbying Among European Intellectual PropertyJudges, 8 UTRECiTr L. REV. 115, 117 (2012).
288. Unified Patent Court, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.orglaw-prac
tice/unitary/patent-court.html (last updated Mar. 6, 2013).
289. See, e.g., David J. Kappos, Patent Law Harmonization, LANDSLIDE, July-Aug.
2011, at 16.
290. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. V 2011).
291. Id. § 103
292. Id. § 102
293. Id. § 112 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
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resolved the problems that arise. 294
Of course, U.S. law is not identical to foreign law. Without knowing the
context of a foreign practice, following it slavishly would not be appropriate. Judges can, however, learn a great deal through the activities of the
Trilateral-a consortium of the European Patent Office, the Japanese
Patent Office, and the PTO-that was founded in 1983.295 The group
meets on a regular basis, often with the Korean and Chinese Intellectual
Property Offices, to discuss worksharing and common practices and to
engage in comparative studies on the application of law to emerging technologies. 296 The Trilateral maintains a Catalogue of Differing Practices
which identifies places where laws diverge, classified into four categories
according to whether the differences could be resolved by the patent offices in individual cases, through new regulations, or require legislative or
judicial action. 297 Admittedly, patent offices concentrate only on pregrant issues. However, there is a significant literature on comparative patent law and a growing cadre of practitioners with international practices
who could help guide courts in their deliberations. 29 8
Entering into a dialogue with foreign courts is certainly tricky given the
current parochial climate. But even Justice Scalia-who generally criticizes arguments based on foreign laW2 9 9 -iS willing to consider them
when countries have agreed to a common approach.3 00 Congress chose to
harmonize patent law unilaterally and not through an international agreement, but the goal remains the same. In a sense, the flexibility created by
taking a convergence approach to harmonization allows the nations of
the world, in Justice Brandeis's words, "to serve as . . . laborator[ies]." 30 1
Laboratories cannot, however, improve the law unless their efforts are
carefully studied; percolation provides the vehicle for benefiting from foreign experience. 302 So far, courts have been reluctant to entertain foreign
294. See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: A
New Paradigmfor International Harmonisation?,24 SING. ACAD. L.J. 669 (2012).
295. About Us, TRILATERAL, http://www.trilateral.net/about.html (last visited July 22,
2013).
296. Events, TRILATERAL, http://www.trilateral.net/events.html (last visited July 22,
2013).
297. Catalogue of Differing Practices,TRILATERAL, http://www.trilateral.net/catalogue
.html (last visited July 22, 2013).
298. See InternationalPatent Law & Practice Committee, IPO, http://www.ipo.org/index
.php/about-ipo/committees/international-patent-law-practice-committee (last visited July
22, 2013); James Pooley & Vicki Huang, Multi-National Patent Litigation: Management of
Discovery and Settlement Issues and the Role of the Judiciary, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 45, 47-48 (2011).
299. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 597 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[T]his Court ... should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.").
300. U.S. Association of ConstitutionalLaw Discussion, FREE REPUBLIC (Jan. 13, 2005),
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1352357/posts.
301. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
302. See generally Sivaramjani Thambisetty, The Learning Needs of the Patent System:
Implicationsfrom Institutionalismfor Emerging Technologies Like Synthetic Biology, (Law
Soc'y Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 18/2013, 2013), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2272980 (describing the many challenges facing institutions in
the patent realm).
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patent claims.3 03 Accordingly, there is little danger that this approach to
percolation would produce the kind of disuniformity that leads to forum
shopping.
IV.

CONCLUSION

After thirty years, it is clear that the dire predictions for the Federal
Circuit have not come to pass. Surprisingly, however, one of the core
background assumptions underlying the court's establishment has turned
out to be wrong. Percolation is more important to the development of
patent law than the proceduralists of the 1980s thought. While the architects of the court left the Supreme Court in the system to inject a generalist perspective, two courts, hierarchically related, do not create the kind
of interchange that is necessary to produce optimal law.
Perhaps the problem is patent law. The statute is not as comprehensive
a codification as the court's architects believed. Or perhaps the problem
lies in the interaction between patent law's technological complexity and
the differing expertise of the two courts. The Supreme Court tends to
distrust the Federal Circuit for adopting special rules in patent cases while
the Federal Circuit is inclined to ignore Supreme Court pronouncements
on technological issues the Federal Circuit considers uniquely within its
competence. But it is also possible that the same result would occur in
connection with other statutory regimes. Perhaps the Federal Circuit experience shows that our system of justice depends in a crucial way on
dialogic development. If so, proposals to establish courts with specialized
authority ought to be considered with care. The development of patent
law may also say something about decisionmaking techniques-that in
the absence of a legislature poised to intervene in a timely fashion, a
strictly formalist approach copes poorly with rapidly changing fields.
There are several plausible ways to introduce more debate into the development of patent law. After the Supreme Court's decision in eBay that
reduced the availability of injunctive relief, the International Trade Commission (ITC) has become a forum of choice for patent holders interested
in excluding goods from the U.S. market.3 " As Arti Rai has suggested,
the ITC's increased involvement in patent disputes could enable it to play
an important policy role, particularly in the remedies area. 305 Additionally, Rai proposes more active participation by agencies dealing with science-based issues, including the Federal Trade Commission, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Communications Commission, and the National Institutes of Health. 306 The National Academies has also shown an interest in patent law and several of its
303.
304.
305.
306.

See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 893-97 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Rai, supra note 41, at 1244.
Id.
Id. at 1239, 1269, 1278, 1249-62.
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recommendations are reflected in the AIA.30 7 Because scientists, lawyers,
economists, and policymakers work together on National Academies reports, Congress would do well to support continuing oversight by that
organization. 308
At the same time, however, the clearest way to improve patent law is to
recognize the importance of percolation within the patent regime itself.
Recent developments have created three candidates for that role: the
PTO, the district courts, and foreign tribunals. Greater deference to the
PTO and district courts would force the Federal Circuit to confront differing approaches and generate more persuasive decisions. With more information on the table, patent law and policy would come to resonate
more fully with the needs of the creative community. Deference would
interfere with the proceduralist vision of a uniform patent regime. But
disuniformity could be produced in ways that do not give rise to forum
shopping. In particular, technology-based experimentation could generate the kind of empirical evidence that, as a society, we increasingly
value. Dialogue with foreign courts is especially worthy of consideration.
Given national differences, it would not provide perfect information.
However, it would avoid disuniformity, facilitate global exploitation of
knowledge products, and help the United States maintain its comparative
advantage in an increasingly competitive innovation marketplace.

307. See discussion supra note 107, see also, e.g., William C. Rooklidge & Alyson G.
Barker, Reform of a Fast-Moving Target: The Development of Patent Law Since the 2004
National Academies Report, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 153, 156 (2009).
308. See discussion supra note 107.

